THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

DDI 6382-82 4 August 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: A/NIO/NESA

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SUBJECT:

Talking Points on Middle East/Lebanon

- 1. As expected Israel is using "salami" tactics to slice off sections of Beirut, increase the pressure on Arafat and, if necessary, prepare the ground for a final assault. The next step may be a drive to cut off the southern suburbs (mostly slums) from the commercial heart of the city.
- 2. Should the Irsaelis encounter weakening PLO resistance, they may escalate their drive into a final offensive. Reaction to a major attack would include:
 - The Syrians would face a serious dilemma; Assad would lose considerable credibility if he did nothing to save the PLO but risks being driven out of the Bekaa valley and all of Lebanon if he provokes the Israelis. Damascus probably will feel compelled to make a symbolic military response. Most likely the Syrians will try to limit ground clashes to Beirut and make a token show of support with their air force. There is some risk, however, that the situation will develop into a larger Syrian-Israeli clash.
 - -- The Soviets are not likely to risk any military move, such as attempting to evacuate the Palestinians, that could mean a clash with the Israelis. We expect continued Soviet naval patrols and increased surveillance if the US expands its naval operations in the area. PLO leaders may seek refuge in the Soviet embassy.
 - -- The UN Security Council would almost certainly consider a tough resolution. It would probably call for mandatory sanctions against Israel.
 - -- A spate of terrorist incidents would occur, including bombings or attacks on US and Israeli officials and installations by

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Approved For Release 2007/04/17: CIA-RDP84B00049R001403410004-0

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